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Case No. 20010129 SC 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a Judgment entered by the Sixth 
Judicial District Court, Honorable David L. Mower on January 30, 
2001. Notice of Appeal was filed February 28, 2001. (R. 969) 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under 
the Judicial Code §78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
[To promote clarity (Rule 24(d), U.R.A.P.) Plaintiffs-
Appellees Pinetree Condominiums will be referred to as "Pinetree 
Condominiums" or "Pinetree" and Defendant-Appellant Ephraim City 
will be referred to as "City."] 
Issue I. Whether or not the Judgment should be affirmed 
which awarded Pinetree Condominiums $45,165.17 as a refund of 
monthly minimum charges assessed to the several owners of the 
individually-owned condominium units representing excess charges 
for distribution of the culinary water requirements which went to 
each unit of the entire structure although through a single water 
line. One connection's monthly rate was charged each of the 
units. Pinetree Condominiums' claim for and the trial court's 
award to them of the refunded judgment is that a payment and 
single fee for one connection exonerated all the condominium 
owners for monthly minimum charges, the trial court held, 
unlawfully had been made by the City to all (dwelling) units.1 
Issue II. Whether or not an interim summary judgment can 
appropriately be granted against the City upon oral evidence that 
unidentified "city personnel" stated to the contractor overseeing 
construction of the condominium units that a single main line into 
the condominium structure of thirty units would better accommodate 
the overall condominiums, was unilaterally interpreted by Pinetree 
Condominiums to mean (and approved by the trial court was) that 
all of the individual condominium units would be exempted from any 
further monthly minimum culinary water assessments after the one-
line fee was imposed. No evidence was offered either establishing 
xOne rate resolution - asserted to advance the trial court's 
decision in favor of Pinetree Condominiums - uses the word 
"measured to each connecting unit" (R.IO) %B WATER RATES: All water 
measured to the customer (dwelling, unit, apartment, etc.); the 
term "measure" emphasized by the trial court's underscoring at 
R.442 H25. 
2 
the date, time, place or persons present; nor was any other 
foundation for which the "city personnel's" (title or authority 
also unexpressed) statement was made.2 
Standard of Review 
Summary judgment (or as in this case judgment based on 
affidavits alone) is granted only when "there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact" and the "moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." (Rule 56 [c] , Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure) In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate 
court views "the facts in a light most favorable to the losing 
party below" and gives "no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness." (Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 
636-637 [Utah 1989]) Correctness is also the standard of review of 
questions of statutory interpretation; in this case interpretation 
of a City Ordinance as well as statutory language in the chapter 
on condominiums (Chapter 8 of Title 57, Utah Code 1953) (Stephens 
v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 519 [Utah 1997]) 
Although the judgment entered at R.953-958 is in the 
nature of a Rule 54 (b) discretionary Order where "the court may 
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer 
2The "city personnel" was completely unidentified; as were the 
date, time, place and circumstances under which this comment was 
given to the condominium general contractor Robert Fitch(R.301); 
Parallel statement by Cahoon (R.108-111). 
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than all of the claims***" the Order appears to be in the nature 
of an interim summary judgment although an "auxiliary" 
pronouncement dated January 30, 2001 and filed February 15, 2001 
(R.95 0-952) as a money judgment appears to be the final judgment. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Article XI, §6, Utah Constitution. 
No municipal corporation, shall directly or indirectly, 
lease, sell, alien or dispose of any waterworks, water 
rights, or sources of water supply now, or hereafter to 
be owned or controlled by it; but all such waterworks, 
water rights and sources of water supply now owned or 
hereafter to be acquired by any municipal corporation, 
shall be preserved, maintained and operated by it for 
supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable 
charges: Provided, that nothing herein contained shall be 
construed to prevent any such municipal corporation from 
exchanging water-rights, or sources of water supply, for 
other water-rights or sources of water supply of equal 
value, and to be devoted in like manner to the public 
supply of its inhabitants. 
Section 10-8-14(1)(a) and (b), Utah Code Annotated 1953 
reads as follows: 
(1) A city may: 
(a) construct, maintain, and operate waterworks, 
sewer collection, sewer treatment systems, gas works, 
electric light works, telecommunications lines, cable 
television lines, or public transportation systems; 
(b) authorize the construction, maintenance and 
operation of the works or systems listed in Subsection 
(1)(a) by others; *** 
Section 57-8-4 of the Utah Condominium Act reads as 
follows: 
Each unit, together with its undivided interest in the 
4 
common areas and facilities, shall, for all purposes, 
constitute real property and may be individually 
conveyed, leased and encumbered and may be inherited or 
devised by will and be subject to all types of juridic 
acts inter vivos or mortis causa as if it were sole and 
entirely independent of all other units, and the separate 
units shall have the same incidents as real property, and 
the corresponding individual titles and interests therein 
shall be recordable. 
Section 57-8-6, Utah Code Annotated reads as follows: 
Each unit owner shall be entitled to the exclusive 
ownership and possession of his unit.*** 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The case is one for interpretation of the almost 
universally employed, typically-enforced city ordinance fixing a 
minimum monthly charge for each unit connected; also the 
application of that ordinance under the Utah Condominium Act 
provides a combination of the considerations of the case. This 
charge was applied to all thirty units in Phase I of the Pinetree 
Condominium units. The trial court held this to be a redundant 
charge for one-line service although all units received the full 
dwelling requirements for each unit. 
Utah has a typically uniform Condominium Ownership Act, 
Chapter 8 of Title 57, U.C.A. 1953, throughout which chapter each 
condominium is regarded as a separate property totally unrelated 
to every other unit in the construction encompassing every given 
unit. 
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For example, §57-8-6 states: 
Each unit owner shall be entitled to the 
exclusive ownership and possession of his unit. 
*** 
Section 57-8-4 next preceding with the catch line "Status 
of the units" states: 
Each unit, together with its undivided interest 
in the common areas and facilities, shall, for 
all purposes, constitute real property and may 
be individually conveyed, leased and encumbered 
and may be inherited or devised by will and be 
subject to all types of juridic acts inter 
vivos or mortis causa as if it were sole and 
entirely independent of all other units, and 
the separate units shall have the same 
incidents as real property, and the 
corresponding individual titles and interests 
therein shall be recordable. 
The trial court held that irrespective of the statutory 
definition and declaration of condominium unit ownership the City 
could charge but one assessment to the main line which served all 
thirty units. 
Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition in the Court Below 
The case was decided on motions for summary judgment: 
i.e., the trial court's order granted Pinetree Condominiums' 
motion for summary judgment (R.435-446) which order is predicated 
on trial court's finding that water service to be chargeable by 
the City must be measured to the customer3. [R-442, f2 5] Under that 
3(Dwelling, unit, apartment, hotel, boarding house, trailer, 
commercial establishment, business, industry, school, church, etc.) 
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interpretation the trial court gave Pinetree Condominiums a money 
judgment as a refund of 2 9 units' monthly minimum charge for 
Pinetree's calculated number of years. The trial court obviously 
utilized the term "measured" as a limitation on the number of 
minimum monthly charges that could be imposed where culinary water 
is delivered under only one main line. The trial court confirmed 
this interpretation by the final judgment for payment of damages 
in the amount of $45,165.17. (R.950-952) The trial court's ruling 
on November 17, 2000 (R.771-774) appears to determine all other 
issues when combined with the order of January 30, 2001 (R-953-
959) from which this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Pinetree Condominiums filed their complaint (R.l-8) 
stating five causes of action alleging various "invidious" 
constitutional violations doing damage to Pinetree Condominiums. 
No constitutional claim was established. 
2. On September 28, 1994 (R-179) then District Juoge 
Don V. Tibbs granted two motions of the City to dismiss and in 
reserving decision on the one critical to the case Judge Tibbs 
ruled as follows: 
5. As to the Plaintiff's third cause of 
action, the motion to dismiss is denied. It 
appears to the court that separate water meters 
should be installed at Plaintiffs expense if 
Defendant is charging each user on their 
minimum rate schedule [emphasis supplied]. (R-
180) 
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3. Pinetree Condominiums never installed nor asked for 
installation of those separate meters as ordered but continued 
making what they called upayments under protest" then brought this 
action to recover those charges and were granted a money judgment 
in the amount of $45,165.17. 
4. The case was still pending at the retirement of 
Judge Tibbs and on April 3, 1997 the Honorable David L. Mower who 
succeeded him on the bench entered his "Order on Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment" on this one critical issue. (R.43 5-
436) This April 1997 order, although not certified under Rule 
54(b) that the holding may be appealable, nevertheless became the 
predicate the trial court employed for his final judgment of 
January 30, 2002. This finding, although sought by Pinetree 
Condominiums as a partial summary judgment (R.44 0) is exclusively 
detectable as the sole reason for the trial court's money judgment 
of January 30, 2001. The trial court first passed over the Tibbs 
Order that meters should be installed at the expense of the 
Plaintiffs by the statement that: 
***The conflict arises in reading Judge Tibbs' 
order of September 28, 1994. It seems to say 
that thirty separate water meters should be 
installed, and with that part I agree. The 
problem is that the order goes on to say that 
the expense of installing the thirty meters 
should be borne by the plaintiff. 
This seems like a strange result to me when the 
facts, as stated herein, show that it was the 
defendant's advice that resulted in the one-
8 
meter installation. (R.444)4 (Emphasis added) 
5. Again Judge Mower relies on the foundation-deficient 
statement of the Pinetree Condominiums contractor that he, Robert 
Fitch (R.101-103), dealt with some unidentified "city personnel" 
at some unidentified time or place at which, admittedly in the 
affidavits, (R.301-303) no one was present except for the 
contractor and the unidentified city personnel. 
6. The most generic finding of the trial court is found 
in the interpretation of the City's ordinance of one word which 
the trial court viewed as the use of an unfortunate (for the City) 
term - the word "measured" - where at paragraph 25 on R.442 he 
states (quoting): 
The Rate Resolution provides in its only 
pertinent part that: 
All water measured to the customer (dwelling 
unit, apartment, hotel, boarding house, 
trailer, commercial establishment, business, 
industry, school, church, etc.) shall be paid 
monthly at the minimum rate *** (Emphasis 
added) 
7. The trial court then added as a non-sequitur the 
observation that [1(35] "Pinetree (describing all thirty units 
collectively) pays the water bill because there is only one bill 
and one meter," an interpretation fatal to the City since the 
4The exclusive and only evidence of that "advice": parallel 
statements by Cahoon (R.108-111) and Fitch (R.301) are both without 
a singular foundation, elaboration, or corroboration: no where, 
when, who was present; or what was said. 
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trial court's final result is that it is sufficient if Pinetree 
Condominiums pays only one minimum monthly charge for 3 0 units. 
8. The interpretation of the City ordinance which the 
trial court does not justify is that while the City cannot measure 
water going into each separate condominium "unit" nevertheless the 
ordinance does provide that all water measured to the customer 
(dwelling unit, apartment, hotel, boarding house, trailer, 
commercial establishment, business, industry, school, church, 
etc.) shall be paid monthly at the rate of $10.80 for the first 
seven thousand (7,000) gallons of water used per month (together 
with an overage for use beyond the 7,000 gallons). Pinetree 
Condominiums pays sewage service charges without complaint on a 
per unit rather than on a single freestanding building basis. 
9. The trial court finds some confusion in the 
circumstance that overcharge (beyond the first 7,000 gallons) is 
charged at ascending rates. The overcharge is neither expressed, 
claimed, or explained in Pinetree Condominiums' pleadings. It may 
be expected that overages seldom occur but should they emerge any 
slight overcharge is absorbed; Pinetree Condominiums making no 
effort to explain how nor complain of this phenomena. 
10. At all times material to this case Ephraim City 
maintained water, sewer and electrical rate and regulation 
10 
ordinances and resolutions under §10-7-7, Utah Code Annotated.5 
The Municipal Code itself, in §10-7-7, defines "users" as "*** any 
house, tenement, apartment, building, place, premises, or lot 
* * *
 # " 
11. Upon a more expanded, retrospective search of its 
official records, the City discovered from its minutes the 
February 17, 1982 recorded minute entry (attached hereto as 
Addendum No. 1) which reads verbatim exactly as recorded that: 
Ken Cahoon and Robert Fitch of the Pine Tree 
Condominium Project propose to change the 30 
unit student housing to 3 0 unit condominium 
project due to financing problems. The only 
difference would be that each unit would have 
an owner, then rental to students could be a 
possibility. Families could buy if they wish. 
Does the Council approve the concept of 
condominiums? ***ready for construction April 
1. Water and sewer billings will be on 
multiple service (30 X -) . ***Total cost approx 
$1.2 million. ***They ask for assurance that 
the community will accept the condominium 
concept. *** (R.910-915) 
12. Pinetree Condominiums made payments for each of the 
thirty condominiums but argues, without evidence, that the 
payments were made under protest. 
13. The Pinetree Condominium approved Fitch Affidavit 
(R.301) is dated January 31, 1994 which Pinetree Condominiums 
produced as its only tangible evidence even though inadmissible 
Especially §§10-7-10, -11 and -12, statutes authorizing 
cities and towns to operate and charge reasonable fees for all 
culinary water distribution and collection for sewer. 
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for no foundation (Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P.) . It is the only evidence 
we can marshal except for the almost identical affidavit of Ken 
Cahoon at R.111. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A city could not, even if there were proof bhat it had 
done so, delegate the authority to an official to contravene 
ordinances of the city such as those pertaining to culinary water 
delivery, distribution and the rates charged therefor (§10-6-76, 
U.C.A. 1953). In Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 
1978) this Court held that policymaking considerations and 
functions assigned to the governing body cannot be delegated to 
ministerial workers. 
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of authority, 
the council has no executive power to delegate and it only 
exercises its power in adopting the ordinances which established 
the policy to be executed by [in this case the mayor] in reviewing 
and approving subdivisions [in the Martindale case, 581 P.2d at 
1025] . 
Even if these limitations were never in effect there is 
no admissible evidence in the record under Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P. 
that a city official [of any type, kind or status] authorized an 
abdication of the city ordinances on rate regulations and 
ordinances. 
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ARGUMENT 
The record is totally absent of any admissible evidence 
that a member of "city personnel" as alleged by Pinetree 
Condominiums, gave the contractor Robert Fitch, or anyone else the 
authority even to provide culinary water service to the 
condominiums consisting of thirty units by one line. 
In marshaling the evidence of Pinetree Condominiums it 
may be agreed that the single line has been there for almost 
twenty years and no objection has ever been made to its existence 
or to the payment of thirty minimum monthly charges by the City 
which Pinetree Condominiums now wants refunded. Conceding that 
fact as contributing to the evidence which we are obligated to 
marshal on behalf of Pinetree Condominiums the existence of one 
water main does not excuse or exempt every unit from or the 
requirement to pay monthly charges under the ordinance of the 
City, as unit is defined not only in the ordinance but 
specifically by state law (§57-8-6, U.C.A. 1953) respecting the 
separateness of condominiums as units. 
In 62 C.J.S. at page 275, Municipal Corporations §152 (b) 
it is stated: 
In the absence of express authority, the 
governing body of the corporation must itself 
exercise general discretionary powers, they 
cannot be exercised by any other board [or 
person] . The governing body of a municipal 
corporation, entrusted by the state with the 
police power, is prevented from delegating its 
high functions to any body or officer and 
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although it may be discharged by others it is 
only those to whom the city commits it. 
In the Montana case of Lazich v. City of Butte, 154 P.2d 
260 (1944) it is held that municipalities have only such powers as 
are expressly granted and those powers cannot be delegated. 
In the Martindale case (581 P.2d 1022 [Utah 1978]) it is 
said (581 P.2d at 1028): 
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of 
powers, the [city] council has no executive 
powers to delegate and it only exercise[s] its 
legislative powers in adopting the ordinances 
which established the policies to be executed 
by the mayor [in this case] reviewing and 
approving subdivisions. 
Lastly, it is inconceivable that an ordinance as plainly 
drawn as that of the City of Ephraim could be - if in fact 
verifiably attempted - subverted by an act of an inferior 
(subordinate) officer and it cannot be necessarily inferred that 
if "city personnel" (Pinetree7s best evidence) approved one line 
into a condominium building the City personnel also exempted all 
other condominium units for a monthly minimum charge. 
It also cannot be disregarded that condominium units are 
separate properties, have no common interest except in the very 
limited way authorized by the Condominium Act and it is by having 
wcommon areas" which are used by the owners of the various 
condominium units. The Condominium Act term in the "common area" 
cannot be interpreted to make all thirty members of Pinetree 
Condominiums Phase I (nor Phases II and III which are patterned 
14 
after Phase I) one large dwelling unit occupying and benefitting 
by the exclusion or exemption from an ordinance which imposes 
minimum monthly culinary water charges to every "unit" as defined 
specifically - at the least - as "dwellings". 
The City for all periods of time material to 
this action has consistent water (and sewer) Rate and 
Regulation Ordinances or correlative resolutions (the 
"Ordinance" or "Resolution") under Chapter 7 of Title 
10, Utah Code Annotated6 Inclusive within which: 
Provide a consistently followed 
definition of a "dwelling unit" [as] 
one or more rooms and a single kitchen 
in a dwelling or apartment, hotel, 
designed as unit for occupancy by one 
family, individual, or individuals for 
living and sleeping purposes.7 (R.482, 
296, 298) 
Prohibited expressly are additional or multiple 
connections on one distribution line (it is a 
misdemeanor for additional units to be 
connected to any service line). (R.498) 
Treat housing, boarding of persons, trailers 
and other similar dwelling units as an adapted 
equation for each consumer, other than 
residential, as separate and individual sewer 
service lines. 
6Esp. §§10-7-10, -11, and -14: The statutes authorizing cities 
and towns to operate and charge reasonable fees for culinary water 
distribution and collection of sewage. Section 10-7-10 defines 
users as "***any house, tenement, apartment, building, place, 
premises, or lot***." 
7A concept now applied by the City and universally in Utah 
municipalities in substantially equivalent form. 
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There have been no objections excepting to this type 
policy or rate schedule. (R.24) 
Pinetree Condominiums' complaint charged, and the trial 
court agreed, that the curiously active verb ''measured"8 was to be 
that limiting - or expanding, from whichever view - barometer for 
monthly rate charging rather than the assumed or practical term 
"delivered", "used", or "consumed" as a monthly assessment to each 
unit for water and sewer. 
Every municipal inhabitant must pay for water at a 
reasonable charge because of overwhelming scarcity in arid Utah. 
(Piatt, et al. v. Town of Torrev, 949 P.2d 325 [Utah 1997]) 
This philosophy is so strong that in three cases the 
Supreme Court has held that boards of commissioners (of cities) 
may not obligate future city councils how to determine and fix 
reasonable rates. (Piatt, et al. v. Town of Torrey, supra, and 
Brummitt v. Ocrden Water Works, 33 U 289, 93 P 828 [1908]; 
Fielstead v. Oaden City, 83 U 278, P.2d 144 [1933]) 
The City called the Court's attention to the Utah 
Condominium Ownership Act, Chapter 8 of Title 57, Utah Code. 
Section 57-8-4, Status of Units, provides: 
Each unit, ***shall, for all purposes, 
constitute real property and may be 
8The term "measurement" is used as a "filler" in one city 
resolution. Relating to water rates, however, it could not be 
applicable since the sewage, another part of the assessment is not, 
we think at lease, "measured." 
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individually conveyed ***as if it were solely 
and entirely independent of all other units and 
the separate units shall have the same 
incidents as real property and the 
corresponding individual titles and interest 
therein shall be recordable. 
(The codified definition of "units" went unrespected by Judge 
Mower.) 
When the Honorable David L. Mower took jurisdiction of 
this case he remarked of Judge Tibbs' Order of September 28, 1994 
that it was ua strange result.'7 Nonetheless, Judge Mower never 
did expressly reverse the holding of Judge Tibbs or acknowledge 
that separate meters should be established at the expense of 
Pinetree Condominiums or in any other manner. (R.444, 445) 
Judge Mower, while disregarding both the ruling of Judge 
Tibbs and the Utah Condominium Act for its definition of a 
condominium unit (§57-8-4) and with no evidence other than the 
Robert Fitch Affidavit which was neither evidence nor admissible 
in evidence because of a failure of foundation (recited supra) 
declared unalterably that the minimum monthly charge could only be 
imposed upon water "measured" to any unit; separate delivery, 
service, or "demand" on the water system capability being 
unimportant to the court. (R.445) 
The trial court ruled that the Affidavit of Robert Fitch 
was adequate and ordered the City to rebate to Pinetree 
Condominiums the sum of $47,445.50 as the amounts which the trial 
court held were overage and redundant assessments to twenty-nine 
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unaccountable condominium units because water was not "measured" 
to each of the separate units leaving the ruling of Judge Don V. 
Tibbs reversed by implication. 
Evidenced by affidavits submitted by the City it was 
established that all other (of very many) structures in the City, 
in which there were separately constructed units, paid assessments 
prescribed (by ordinance) for them individually. 
TO MARSHAL PINETREE CONDOMINIUMS' EVIDENCE. 
At the trial court's suggestion in response to the 
urging of Pinetree Condominiums, a summary of all chcirges which 
Pinetree Condominium believed to be excessive overpayments by 
Pinetree Condominiums was assembled as an accounting of its 
claimed damages. 
The City had nothing by which proof either of lack or 
diminution of Pinetree Condominiums' numbers could be challenged. 
The City stood on the basis of no liability of any kind, 
contending that damages alone do not create a cause of action.9 
(Schmeck v. City of Shawnee, 647 P.2d 1263 [Kan. 1982]) 
The City did cite cases that do allow a judge to change 
his mind; however, this Court is abundantly aware of its policy 
when determining that objections were adequately reserved in the 
Record. There was never an appealable ruling or order eligible 
9
 (Maxim) Damnum Absque Injuria esse potest. 
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or as a qualification for appellate jurisdiction until the trial 
judge's January 30, 2001 ruling. (R.950-952) 
Pinetree advanced - but did not prove, only intimated -
that the City had at one period in time allowed some public 
buildings to be served by one connecting line and only one charge 
assessed. The traditional history of most cities is that since 
incorporation, beginning especially in the penultimate decade of 
the 1800s, several buildings accommodated multiple occupancies 
but as the City's culinary water.distribution system was advanced 
along with incorporation of the City and dwindling water 
supplies, the Cities - and in this case Ephraim City - attempted 
to isolate any structure accommodating more than one consumer. 
The City's response was that no unit was known to be in violation 
of the multi-unit policy of the City but each unit was paying a 
monthly charge for each unit irrespective of the outer perimeter 
of the building (Alan Grindstaff Affidavit R.499-507) . Every 
unit in each structure was assessed (and was compelled to pay) 
a monthly minimum charge; all potential violators were denied 
continuous culinary water (also, the City did not, at any time, 
interrupt assessment of the monthly minimum charges even though 
a unit was seasonally or sometime otherwise unoccupied). (R.502-
506) Pinetree Condominiums failed to show any discrimination 
damaging the owners of individual condominiums. 
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In municipal bond obligations the City covenanted to 
maintain consistency in meeting debt service obligations. The 
City exhibited to the bond purchasers the capability of 
maintaining a system meeting the heaviest or the maximum demands 
under any circumstance. Lenders demanded a continuing disclosure 
of sufficient consumer connectors to meet the maximum "demand" 
for bond debt service as well as community health along with a 
safe supply in storage. All improvements to achieve that effect 
were expensive, running to multiple millions of dollars; a huge 
debt for small or medium-sized communities in Utah. (R.500-506) 
The peak demands for electric power were not unlike a minimum 
"demand" charge for water. 
CONCLUSION 
Pinetree Condominiums offered neither evidence of, nor 
reason for, an exemption of 2 9 of the 3 0 units in one condominium 
structure to justify the summary (or final) judgment against the 
City which, in either nomenclature, should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHAMBERLAIN ASSOCIATES 
Kerj/ Chamberlain 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant were mailed to the following by U.S. regular 
mail, postage prepaid, on this 29th day of January, 2002: 
Wayne H. Braunberger 
Ashton, Braunberger, Boud & Draper 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellees 
765 East 9000 South, Suite A-l 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
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They ask that w^ir closing hour be extended to 1 £p AM. 
MOTION by Gwen McGarry to extend a variance to Bumpers allowing closing 
hours to extend to 1:00 AM on weeknights and 12:00 midnight on Saturday 
night* Second by Hilmer Peterson. Vote unanimous. 
Discussion of Solid Waste Disposal covered the need for a new site, 
mandatory pickup, sanitary landfill, and possibility of joining"other 
cities in a county-vide effort. Mayor Jensen will pursue the joint Jk»J&tt 
concept through the Mayors and Commissioners* Association. 
Gwen McGarry reports that the Library Board will advertise for an assistant 
librarian. She also reports that Richard V Nielsen resigned his position 
on the Arena Committee. Several names were suggested. Ben Black was 
appointed. 
Roy Held reports that the cheese distribution went well. He also reports 
that the Fire Dept needs a 2n water connection at the Fire Station. 
Discussion of hazard on west side of sidewalk where creek comes out 
from the Main Street culvert resulted in a suggestion that the culvert 
be extended on the west end by Doyle's. The culvert and part of the 
creek should be cleaned. The City & Irrigation Company will coordinate 
with Mrs McNeil. 
Adjourned 9:30 FM. . 
MINUTES OF REGULAR COUNCIL MEETING HELD FEBRUARY 17, 1982 at 7:00 FM. 
PRESENT: Mayor Jensen, Roy Reid, Keith Keisel, Leon Olsen, Hilmer 
Peterson. 
GUESTS: Elaine Raid, Robert. H Fitch (Pine Tree Condo Project) 
Ken 0 Cahoon (Pine Tree Condo Project), Seth Butterfield 
(Butterfield & Associates, Inc), Seth L Butterfield 
(Butterfield & Associates, Inc), Brent R Larson (Ephraim 
Irrigation Co), Allan M Sharp (Mountain West Cable TV) 
Douglas H Olson (Ephraim Irrigation Co), Earl Tuttie, 
(Manti Soil Conservation Service), Lorin Hunt (Manti), 
Arthur King (Ephraim Irrigation Co), Evelyn McNeill (Pyramid). 
Elaine Reid reports that she lost sheep in November and again last week 
from dogs. The police have told her to sign a complaint at the County 
Attorney's Office. Mayor Jensen says the police have been very active 
controlling dogs in the past year. Council members comment that she has 
irsry right to be upset. Mayor Jensen will follow through with her 
complaint tomorrow. . He states that he has suggested to the Mayors & 
Commissioners Association that the County have an animal control officer 
and get the cities1 to pay a proportionate share. 
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Doug Olson, President of the Ephraim Irrigation Company states that the 
Irrigation Company feels it should apply for a complete sprinkler system 
for the City and all the farm land which is under the Irrigation Co. 
The plan is to put the water in a pipe from a pond site near Bald Mountain 
for a small hydro generation plant to be located at the corner of H R 
Christensen's property. 
Earl Tuttle and Lorin Hunt of the Soil Conservation Service suggest 
a joint venture between the city and the Irrigation Co. The project 
could be divided into six (6) units: South, City, Lime Kiln, Kesko 
(Old Cemetery), Haig, and North. It will take approximately five (5) 
years from start to finish. 1.58 shares of water per acre would be 
required. A citizens committee was suggested. 
The Irrigation Company hks voted to purs ue the project. The city will 
appoint a committee to accfeas public opinion. Soil Conservation Service 
will work closely with the project. 
Leon Olsen states that with Federal ar^ State getting more involved with 
water, it is wise to get the most efficient use of water possible. 
Allen Sharp says that Mountain West TV has completed 95% of the construction 
and 90% of the service connections to those who are interested. He asks 
that they be released from their performance bond. Discussion ensued 
with Keith Keisel asking "Will this company skip as some other cable 
franchises have?" 
Leon Olaan: This company has money tied up in construction and materials 
and can't afford to leave it. Roy Reid: Do they need an extension? 
Hilmer Peterson: Cannot comment since I am not familiar with the franchise. 
Paul Frichknecht: I see no further need for the bond. Mayor Jensen: 
Some channels need to be cleared up. Perhaps the bond should be extended 
for one (l) month. 
MOTION by Roy Reid to extend Mountain West Cable TV performance bond to 
April 7, 1982, to finish setting antenna and upgrade signals on some 
channels"! SHcond-LejonJOleeir: Vote unanimous. 
5£ Ken Cahoon and Robert Fitch of the Pine Tree Condominium Project propose 
to change the 30 unit a&t&em housing to 30 unit condominium project due 
to financing problems. The only difference would be that each unit 
would have an owner, then rental to students could be a possibility. 
Families could buy if they wish. Does the Council approve the concept 
of condominiums? The power will be 3-phase. They would be ready for 
construction April 1. Water and sewer billings will be on multiple 
service (30 I - ) . The walls will have R-19 rating. Total cost approx 
$1.2 million. Construction cost $900,000. Maintenance standards are 
high. They ask for assurance that the community will ace ept the condominium 
concept. They were directed to contact the Planning and Zoning Board for 
letter. 
\ 
Butterfield Associates^Siscussed possible financing. State—lan^allows 
cities^to^establish a Redevelopment Agency with the Council acting as 
the Agency. This allows tax increment financing for certain types of 
projects. Mr Butterfield proposes that they contract to do the technical 
work. The city would form a Redevelopment Agency which would have bonding 
abi l i ty . The cost of this type of funding would amount to about 10% 
on $300,000. Bonds could be ready for sale in three to six months. 
